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through Afﬁrmative Action:  
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Abstract
Malaysia's afﬁrmative action, introduced as the New Economic Policy (NEP)1 
in 1971 to redress Malay economic setbacks, failed in its objective to acquire 
30 percent equity of Malaysian public companies for Malays by 1990. This 
failure was translated into the government's failure to develop a sufﬁcient 
number of Malay entrepreneurs with the skills to meet this target. The gov-
ernment had devised afﬁrmative action under the NEP in the belief that it 
was a recipe for entrepreneurial development.  This paper argues that af-
ﬁrmative action for the development of entrepreneurs is likely to fail as it 
contradicts the principles of entrepreneurship. This paper offers a proposition 
that afﬁrmative action, far from uplifting Malay entrepreneurialism, had in-
tuitively beneﬁtted non-beneﬁciaries as they were driven to greater resolve.
Keywords: affirmative action, Malaysia, entrepreneurship, NEP, Malays 
Introduction 
The paper will begin with a general discussion on afﬁrmative action, its 
beginnings as state policy and a means for upliftment of the marginal-
ized.  It will follow with background on Malaysia, the focus of this paper; 
its multi-ethnic people and their economic disparities. Following will 
be a discussion on the New Economic Policy (NEP), here referred to 
interchangeably as afﬁrmative action, how it was used to address Malay 
marginalization, its outcomes and its implications for Malay entrepre-
neurship development. A proposition is offered in the next section along 
with a survey and its ﬁndings before the conclusion of the paper.  
Why Afﬁrmative Action?
Afﬁrmative action is to 'afﬁrm to act' against perceived social imbalances 
and is essentially based on the principle of non-discrimination (Findley 
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et al. 2004). To put it another way, it means assistance to the underprivi-
leged. Whichever way we look at it, it is not new as various ways of 
asserting afﬁrmative action have been with us since time immemorial. 
But its institutionalization is quite recent. India can be said to be the 
ﬁrst country to introduce afﬁrmative action policies when it extended 
special treatment to its untouchable castes following independence in 
1947. But, of course, India never called it afﬁrmative action.  
We could take a page from the US since it was there where the term was 
introduced. President John F. Kennedy ﬁrst applied the term ofﬁcially in 
an Executive Order in 1961 that established the President's Commission 
on Equal Employment Opportunity (Sowell 2004: 4). Though Kennedy 
said in that landmark speech that the government 'will take afﬁrmative 
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated 
during their employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or 
national origin', the order did not advocate preferential treatment of af-
fected groups, rather it called for employees to be treated without regard 
to their ethnic or national differences and sought to eliminate discrimina-
tion. When Kennedy's pronouncement subsequently became law during 
President Lyndon Johnson's tenure under the Civil Rights Act (1964), 
courts were empowered to order an organization to adopt 'afﬁrmative 
action as may be appropriate as both punishment and correction for a 
ﬁnding of discrimination' (Crosby 1994: 13-41).
Since then there have been several edicts that reinforced the require-
ments of equal employment opportunity and afﬁrmative action. In de-
ﬁning afﬁrmative action, it means to afﬁrm action to ensure that ethnic 
minorities, women, people with disabilities and other underrepresented 
groups are fairly represented in colleges and in the workplace (Miller et 
al. 1997). This includes preference for qualiﬁed and employable 'target 
groups' identiﬁed by the US Code of Federal Regulations as ethnic-mi-
nority groups (African American, Hispanic American, Native American 
and Asian American) and women and as those bearing the brunt of 
discrimination (Crosby 1994).
But deﬁnitions of afﬁrmative action are not entirely satisfactory as 
there are tensions in applying it between equal employment opportunity 
and equal opportunity policy. Basically, afﬁrmative action seeks to ad-
dress historical injustices or avoid the wrongs of the past. It is proactive 
and looks to public policy for redress, whereas equal opportunity is 
reactive and focuses on the individual or what he or she considers to be 
equal. There is also the paradox of inequality as either can perpetuate 
tyranny. Afﬁrmative action policies are applied in a variety of ways: em-
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ployment, workplace issues and minority quotas in colleges were given 
the most prominence in the US. But there is no escaping the fact that an 
underlying objective of afﬁrmative action must be the general economic 
upliftment of marginalized communities. In the case of Malaysia, this is 
the focus through which entrepreneurship development is given special 
attention. What does afﬁrmative action mean in Malaysia?
Malaysia Background
Malaysia has a population of 25 million comprising 50 percent Malays, 
24 percent Chinese, 11 percent indigenous, seven percent Indians (mostly 
Tamils), and eight percent others. The Chinese have been in the Malay 
States since the ﬁfteenth century; by 1930 they were over a million in 
number (Andaya and Andaya 1982). Most Chinese came as traders but 
their biggest presence was in the tin industry. The Indians, too, came 
as traders from as early as the ﬁfteenth century but the majority were 
brought in by the British as indentured rubber tappers at the turn of the 
last century. Indians were later brought in to ﬁll positions in the civil 
service, teaching professions and the railways.  Though Indians are the 
smallest minority of the three major races they have a higher percentage 
of professionals and entrepreneurs, such as the late rubber plantation 
owner Arumugam Pillai, Kishu Tirathrai, a well-known textile trader, 
and Malaysia's richest man, billionaire Ananda Krishnan. But most In-
dians are poor. This was highlighted in the Ninth Malaysia Plan, which 
noted that Indians control only 1.2 percent of the economy having de-
clined from 1.5 percent since the Eighth Malaysian Plan. There has been 
a shift of Indians to the urban areas for work as the rubber and palm 
estates they had worked in were turned into commercial and residential 
complexes. Indians had blamed the NEP and the lack of educational 
facilities for the rise in poverty and high crime among their youth. They 
vented their displeasure with a series of militant street demonstrations 
in 2008, which Indian activist groups reasoned was the culmination of 
decades of being the most marginalized among the three major races of 
Malaysia.2 The economic distress of the Indian population is not new 
and their economic situation has been deteriorating since the advent of 
the NEP (Mohamed Nawab 2007). 
The Chinese have tended toward self-employment and are known for 
their proclivity for business, but given their large population they have 
not been indifferent to the politics of the country. This is underscored by 
their partnership in the ruling Barisan Nasional and their sizeable mem-
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berships in the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Keadilan.  Chinese 
businessmen, though, are known to independently align themselves 
with the political elite to whom they will appeal for the resolution of 
their problems rather than deferring them to their own kongsi network 
(Gomez and Benton 2004). Chinese business relationships with the 
political elite and the ruling class have a long history (McVey 1992; Yo-
shihara 1988). Perhaps one of the most glaring examples is the gaming 
licence for a casino development in the Genting Highlands in the state 
of Pahang that was approved by the ruler of the state and given to the 
late Tan Sri Lim Goh Tong. Chinese entrepreneurs such as Tan Sri Lim 
Goh Tong and Robert Kwok and the family members of the Hong Leong 
Group were friends of the late Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman 
and they have been known to have close royal connections.3 Despite 
Chinese businesses being so dominant, they have yet to gravitate as a 
cohesive business group (Gomez and Benton 2004: 15). Their different 
clan loyalties, business competition, and political connections could 
be some reasons why they are this way.  Given the ethnic composi-
tion, the Chinese hold the balance of power in Malaysian politics, and 
contrary to Gomez and Benton (2004), they are not treated as 'second 
class' citizens, considering they are better off economically with a higher 
standard of living. With the economy dominated by the Chinese and 
the civil service by the Indians, the Malays, who are mostly found in 
the armed forces and police or conﬁned to the rural areas working as 
ﬁshermen or farmers, felt left behind. Malay dissatisfaction came to a 
head at the 1969 parliamentary General Elections when bloody riots 
(commonly remembered as the May 13 Riots) broke out between the 
Malays and the Chinese. The event precipitated the far-reaching reforms 
of the NEP, which was primarily a policy to address Malay grouses 
(Yoshihara 1988: 60; Crouch 1992: 23). The NEP was justiﬁed not only 
on economic but also political grounds. A major event that followed the 
May 13 Riots was the establishment of Barisan Nasional (BN), a multi-
party grand coalition that combined all the major ethnic parties. The 
brainchild of incoming Prime Minister Tun Razak, the establishment 
of the BN was heralded as the most successful  political event and has 
been the government continuously since. Tun Razak immediately set 
out to address Malay dissatisfaction and initiated the government's 
report on the May 13 Riots (in a White Paper entitled Towards National 
Harmony) which stressed political and psychological factors had con-
tributed to the conﬂict. The report and public comments of government 
leaders also emphasized economic causes: it cited the failure of earlier 
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economic policies to address the 'relative deprivation' of the Malays in 
comparison with non-Malays. Expert commentaries at the time, while 
accepting that the Malays still lagged behind the Chinese economically, 
did not, however, subscribe to relative deprivation as a reason for the 
conﬂict (Means 1991: 23). Yet theories of relative deprivation continued 
to be ascribed to the May 13 Riots by the Razak administration to justify 
certain policies. Resting on the notion of Malay dissatisfaction as the 
cause of the 1969 unrest, Razak embarked on an aggressive economic 
agenda that was primarily directed to correct the perceived inequities 
of Malay underdevelopment.
To allay anti-Malay cynicism, he assured non-Malays that their wealth 
and jobs would not be expropriated to hasten Malay aspirations as his 
economic policies 'will be distributed in a just and equitable manner'. 
Underlying this assurance, he promoted the slogan of Masyarakat Adil 
(Just Society) in his launching of the NEP in the Second Malaysia Plan 
on 11 July 1971. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP)
At the outset, it should be noted that the NEP was not a document as 
such, rather it was a series of policies that were developed following 
the May 13 Riots and were entrenched in the Second Malaysian Plan 
launched in July 1971. 
Often incorrectly identiﬁed as a mechanism to facilitate Malay rights, 
the NEP was primarily designed to reform the economy to meet Malay 
expectations for a greater share in the economy (Shome 2002: 98-101). 
The NEP prioritized its objectives by tending ﬁrst to the needs of rural 
Malays whose plight was identiﬁed with stagnated rural projects, lower 
production yields, and rising poverty in their rapidly increasing popula-
tion. Recommendations in the NEP included the rapid modernization 
of rural development, facilitating the more efﬁcient access and use of 
state-sponsored land and the reducing of stringent requirements for 
state loans. Along with these facilities the government also stepped up 
its drive to improve public amenities in the rural areas and training op-
portunities for the high number of unemployed rural youth. The second 
measure was for the progressive reduction of Malay dependence on the 
diminishing agriculture subsistence. In line with this policy, the NEP 
recommended a concerted drive for greater Malay exposure in the urban 
sectors of commerce and industry to be steered by public enterprises 
such as the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) or Council of Trust for the 
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Bumiputera, Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (Pernas) or the National Cor-
poration Ltd, the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs), 
the Urban Development Authority (UDA), and the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Finance Ltd (MIDF).
Razak set a range of goals for the next two decades to measure the 
success of the NEP recommendations. One of those goals was to target 
30 percent of the country's corporate wealth for Malay ownership by the 
year 1990. To achieve this, the government adopted a highly corporatist 
'government-in-business' strategy to fulﬁl 'bumiputera' (literally 'son 
of the soil', which applies to indigenous peoples of Malaysia but more 
often to Malays) ownership of public corporations. The government's 
deft acquisitions and equity holdings in major public companies through 
Pernas, UDA and the SEDCs, though growing steadily, did not immedi-
ately address the more pressing needs of economic assistance for most 
ordinary Malays. To overcome this problem the NEP bolstered its objec-
tives with a range of measures that were designed to accelerate Malay 
participation in the reform process. Included in these measures were 
the retrospective expansion of Malay special rights in the form of land 
rights, subsidized education, generous recruitment quotas for the civil 
service and certain business prerogatives that were already protected in 
the Constitution and had been gradually expanded in the past decade. 
The NEP re-formulated the system of job quotas and Malay special rights 
for greater privileged access to higher paying jobs, management posi-
tions, the professions, tertiary education admissions and equity stakes 
in companies. The NEP restructuring targets were also extended to the 
private sector. Companies were asked to submit plans for employing, 
training and promoting Malays at all levels of their operations and to 
adhere to the Malay employment quotas that were generally set at 40 
percent of the total labour force of the company. 
Many companies however chose to ignore this directive for the obvi-
ous impracticality of it and the absence of effective monitoring of their 
compliance. But for new foreign companies there was no escape from 
this policy, as Malay employment was a condition for their acceptance 
of the licensing and tax concessions that were available to them.
The Outcomes of the NEP
The implementation of the NEP coincided with a buoyant Malaysian 
economy during the years from 1971 to 1974. Politically, the environ-
ment presented Razak with a most propitious time to push through 
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with relative ease many of the provocative NEP recommendations as 
it made the task of managing opposition dissent and racial cynicism 
easier to handle. The vitality of the NEP in the Second Malaysia Plan 
1971-75 was manifested by a real GDP growth rate of 7.1 percent per 
annum that was achieved against the target growth rate of 6.8 percent 
per annum. While the industrial sector had doubled its share of growth 
since 1961, agriculture declined by a third, underscoring a successful 
policy shift towards industrialization(Bowie 1991: 93).
Due to a worldwide recession, the hiatus in 1975 was cushioned by 
the high growth rates of earlier years. The rapid recovery that followed 
in 1976 meant that little or no adjustment was necessary to alter either 
the pace or strategies of the NEP.  In the early 1970s the government 
acquired multinational companies that had their major business interests 
in Malaysia such as London Tin (by whose acquisition Malaysia con-
trolled the world tin market) and rubber giants Sime Darby and Socﬁn 
(Yoshihara 1988: 22). By 1975 Malay ownership of capital increased to 7.8 
percent from 2.4 percent in 1970 but still fell short of the target of nine 
percent. Within three years of the NEP implementation, 98 percent of all 
those recruited for government service were Malays, a percentage that 
far exceeded the 4:1 Malay ratio (Means 1991: 26). During the period of 
the Second Malaysia Plan, Malay employment in the commercial and 
industrial sectors rose rapidly to parallel the rate in the public service. 
Similarly, Malay admissions to institutions of higher education also 
increased dramatically. Malay student numbers at the University of 
Malaya, for instance, increased from 49.7 percent to 66.4 percent between 
1970 and 1979 and in about the same period government expenditure 
per student rose from RM 3,700 to RM 12,900, underscoring the NEP 
policy for greater access and privileges for Malay students. Of the total 
of 4,930 scholarships offered in its 1974-75 calendar year, the University 
of Malaya offered 3,505 to Malay students. The government also actively 
participated in funding Malay students for overseas studies.
 The Razak administration's efforts to eradicate poverty did not match 
the impressive growth in the economy. It managed to reduce poverty by 
a paltry 5.4 percent of the 49.3 percent of households living in poverty 
(Means 1991: 70). Part of the problem was attributed to the government's 
policy of  moving away from agriculture, which caused untrained rural 
Malays to look for work in the cities where they soon established them-
selves in the notorious squatter colonies of Kuala Lumpur—the subject 
of constant jibes by cynics of the NEP. The Second Malaysia Plan had 
also experienced a widening gap in income between the rich and the 
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poor, a phenomenon that not only called into question the inequality 
of Razak's reforms but was also a perennial embarrassment that succes-
sive governments were simply unable to redress. While the NEP was 
generally positive to the overall well-being of the Malays, it did not give 
them beneﬁts at the speed that Razak had intended. One of the reasons 
for the slower-than-expected growth was the government's acquisitive 
policy of corporate ownership that muddled ﬁscal policy and foreign 
investment. First, inordinate government spending in infrastructure and 
non-productive sectors caused revenue deﬁcits and increased borrow-
ings. Funds were also being drained for an equity buying spree to meet 
corporate ownership objectives. Second, rising inﬂation, ambiguities in 
acquisition policies, and interventionist regulations as well as repressing 
private sector expansion compounded by capital outﬂows, frightened 
away foreign investments.
Investors also found it hard to reserve bumiputera preferential share-
holding since bumiputera capital was acutely scarce. Capital was of no 
issue if the government was itself the equity partner as funds could be 
allocated from state budgets or from borrowings from state boards that 
also had been set up with state endowment. But for the average private 
individual, the option was often straight government loans through either 
state loan agencies or banks such as Bank Pembangunan, Bank Rakyat 
and Bank Bumiputra, whose liquidity in the main was also tax-resourced. 
The shares were often enough for the collateral required for the loans 
and interest could be nothing or minimal. Sometimes shares were gifted 
at absolutely no cost to the beneﬁciary bumiputera director, especially 
in instances where the benefactor was of such prestige that his name (al-
ways male) alone carried enormous commercial value to the investor. If 
access to loans was impossible and if the investor wanted a bumiputera 
partner badly enough, a company advance was usually arranged for the 
partner and repayments were offset against future dividends or other 
remuneration. This system could alternatively have a complex 'buy back' 
arrangement where the shares could only be resold to the investor at a 
pre-determined price (Shome 2002: 101). Although bumiputera equity 
obliged no further contribution from the partner, the company would 
normally utilize the services of its Malay partner in largely public relations 
roles. The performance and the day-to-day running of the company rested 
exclusively with the investor and the prohibition on the repatriation of 
foreign capital negated debt-recovery by liquidation.
Though the NEP managed only 19.4 percent4 Malay ownership 
of public companies in 1990 against the target of 30 percent, it had 
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fulﬁlled a well-conceived policy that was anchored by its main objec-
tives of poverty eradication and the reduction of inequality of wealth 
(Shome 2002: 169). On the face of it everyone ought to be happy with it 
as the NEP was not race-speciﬁc and sought equal treatment across all 
ethnic groups. But implicit in its objectives was its intention to boost 
Malay participation in the commercial activity of the nation that was 
dominated by the Chinese, the second largest ethnic group (Milne and 
Mauzy 1999: 51-53; Korff 2001). The policy has been seen as successful 
in attaining its ﬁrst objective of poverty eradication but less successful 
in attaining the second objective of wealth distribution (Yusof 2001: 
74-92). Granted, under the NEP the Malays had been exposed to all the 
tools of modern business, but that alone would not be enough to catch 
up with the Chinese since there had to be equity ﬁrst in the employ-
ment market to get some sense of what the commercial world is about. 
It is well known that the Malays were faced with difﬁculties in obtain-
ing employment in business organizations mainly owned by Chinese 
and foreigners (Gullick 1981: 149). This may be attributed to the lack 
of conﬁdence by foreigners of Malay entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills and the inclination by the Chinese to employ Chinese workers 
(Mahathir 1970: 39-40, 82-83). 
The NEP also provided an avenue for Malays to mobilize their capital 
and increase their savings. This was achieved through the establish-
ment of agencies such as the Pilgrims Fund Board or Lembaga Tabung 
Haji and National Equity Corporation or Permodalan Nasional Ber-
had (PNB). Traditionally, the Malays, being Muslims, shunned saving 
money at banks due to the usury associated with investment activities 
of banks (Gullick 1981: 148). In addition, unlike the Chinese who were 
more sophisticated with money dealings, the Malays were seen as less 
capable of managing their money competitively (Mahathir 1970: 167-69; 
Yoshihara 1988: 56; Mackie 1992: 164). The Chinese also had a strong and 
organized network to mobilize their capital and this had served as their 
competitive advantage over the Malays in business activities (McVey 
1992: 20-21; Othman et al. 2005). Concerted effort by the government 
to strategically mobilize Malay capital and to encourage investment 
among Malays had helped them to build their commercial acumen as 
well as to increase their savings. 
Another advantage of the NEP was that it provided Malays with 
an opportunity to obtain better qualiﬁcations (Shamsul 1997) with the 
assumption that it would create entrepreneurial savvy. By 1990 it did 
create an enlarging Malay middle-class and more professionals so that 
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by 2004 there were, in fact, more Malay doctors than Chinese doctors 
(Kessler 1992: 145; Sowell 2004: 70). The presence of these Malays in vari-
ous professional and employment sectors had, in some ways, helped to 
restore Malay conﬁdence and the perception that the NEP had helped 
the Malays to improve their standard of living and economic position 
(Sloane 1999: 54, 119-120).
A signiﬁcant outcome under the NEP was the creation of govern-
ment-owned entities that became directly involved in the commercial 
activities of the nation. These public and state enterprises became prox-
ies of Malay wealth, supposedly on behalf of the Malay population 
(Jesudason 1989: 72, 86-100; Searle 1999: 58-78). Therefore, even though 
Malay corporate ownership had increased during the period of NEP, this 
ownership was mainly concentrated in public enterprises rather than in 
the hands of individual Malays, a situation Malays ﬁnd unacceptable 
(Gullick 1981: 147). Another major setback of the NEP was that it gave 
too much attention to the economic aspect of Malay capital building 
and too little attention to the psychological and sociological aspects 
of enterprise creation. For example, the government was accused of 
providing Malays with easy access to large amounts of capital without 
instilling and nurturing an entrepreneurial spirit among them as well 
as providing a conducive environment for their entrepreneurship de-
velopment (Gomez 1999: 35; Tan 2006). Finally, while the NEP had been 
successful in containing Malay discontent towards other ethnic groups 
in Malaysia, the policy created dissatisfaction with non-Malays (Tan 
1992: 194; Milne and Mauzy 1999: 54). The non-Malays, in particular 
the Chinese, felt that they had been discriminated against under the 
policy and this then created feelings of insecurity with regards to their 
business investment in the country (Gullick 1981: 146, 149, 250). As a 
result, there had been massive movements of capital overseas (Gomez 
and Jomo 1999: 44).
The foregoing discussion has illustrated the advantages and disad-
vantages of Malaysia's NEP.  While the NEP had been successful in 
eradicating poverty and reducing inter-ethnic income disparities by 
providing Malays with better access to education and employment 
opportunities, its success in promoting and providing a conducive en-
vironment for Malay entrepreneurial development was questionable. 
Even though the NEP had been successful in restoring Malay conﬁdence 
in the government and reducing their discontent towards other ethnic 
groups in Malaysia, the policy has been seen as discriminating against 
non-Malays. 
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NEP on Entrepreneurship Development
Before we begin to discuss this issue, we should explain, at least brieﬂy, 
what we understand by entrepreneurship in the context of the NEP. 
First, what is entrepreneurship? Despite a mass of literature, scholars 
are still not able to come up with a clear and consistent deﬁnition of 
entrepreneurship. Part of this difﬁculty is due to a failure to integrate 
the two main approaches in deﬁning the term: the functional approach 
and the indicative approach (Casson 2003). The functional approach is 
quite abstract and it simply describes what an entrepreneur does. On 
the other hand, the indicative approach provides a description of the 
entrepreneur by which he may be recognized. The former approach has 
been adopted mainly by the economic theorist, the latter by the economic 
historian. One can ﬁnd almost as many deﬁnitions of the entrepreneur 
as there are literatures. Generally, an entrepreneur can be deﬁned as:
• one who creates a new business in the face of risk and uncertainty 
for the purpose of achieving proﬁt and growth by identifying op-
portunities and assembling the necessary resources to capitalize on 
them (Foley 2003: 135)
• enterprising individuals who dare to be different and risk envy and 
ostracism to reap possible personal gain from the exploitation of 
opportunities (Kalantaridis 2004: 39) 
• individuals who innovate, identify and create business opportuni-
ties, assemble and coordinate new combinations of resources so as 
to extract the most proﬁts from their innovations in an uncertain 
environment (Swierczek and Quang 2004: 134)
• any member of the economy whose activities are in some manner 
novel and entail the use of imagination, boldness, ingenuity, leader-
ship, persistence and determination in the pursuit of wealth, power 
and position (Montanye 2006: 555).
Most scholars are agreed that entrepreneurship is about vision, inno-
vation and change, but there are those like Schumpeter (1934) who will 
not accept the often-touted quality of risk-taking while others, such as 
Knight (1921), think uncertainty is a signiﬁcant element in the making of 
an entrepreneur. Schumpeter detaches the entrepreneur from risk bear-
ing. He says 'risk taking is in no case an element of the entrepreneurial 
function. Even though [the entrepreneur] may risk his reputation, the 
direct economic responsibility of failure never falls on him' (Schumpeter 
1934: 137). He makes a clear distinction between entrepreneurship and 
invention. To him, inventions are economically irrelevant if they are 
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not being put into practice. He accepts that entrepreneurs could well 
be inventors but proposes that they are inventors, not by nature of their 
function, but by coincidence and vice versa (Schumpeter 1934: 88-89). 
He further argues that the typical entrepreneur is more self-centred and 
relies less on tradition and connection (Schumpeter 1934: 92).
Schumpeter associates entrepreneurship with creating and the en-
trepreneur as a resourceful innovator (Kirzner 1973). To Schumpeter, 
the entrepreneur is the bold leader who was willing to break through a 
wide array of ordinary constraints that set him apart from the manager 
(Kalantaridis 2004). Schumpeter (1934) advances the view that the entre-
preneur is motivated by ﬁrst, 'the dream and the will to found a private 
kingdom'; second, by the will to prove oneself superior to others; third, 
for the challenge of creating (Schumpeter 1934: 93). But he does not seem 
to think that entrepreneurship is necessarily a life-long pursuit.  Rather, 
he says, as the market becomes more cluttered and competitive, the 
rate of proﬁts will deteriorate and the innovative activity will diminish 
(Kalantaridis 2004). Schumpeter is no different from other theorists who 
see the entrepreneur as one strongly motivated by pecuniary proﬁt and 
sociologically distinct, a creative innovator unafraid to break away from 
established routines (Kirzner 1973; Montanye 2006). 
Frank Knight's work appeared about the same time as that of Schum-
peter. One of Knight's main contributions is attributed to his well-known 
theory of proﬁt (Knight 1921). He says proﬁt is the reward for those 
who are willing to bear the cost of uncertainty. What distinguishes 
entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs is their 'capacity by percep-
tion and inference to form correct judgments as to the future course of 
events in the environment . . . of special importance is the variation in 
the power of reading human nature, of forecasting the conduct of other 
men' (Knight 1921: 241-42). 
Another important aspect of Knight's contribution to entrepreneurial 
studies is his detailed distinction between risk and uncertainty as an 
economy-wide feature affecting all economic agents (Grebel et al. 2003). 
Knight argues that uncertainty cannot be treated as risk because one can-
not formulate a risk distribution for unique events such as the likelihood 
of a singer losing his voice (Khalil 2003). Hence, unlike risk, uncertainty 
cannot be estimated and therefore it cannot be insured. Knight (1921) 
further emphasizes that the only risk that leads to proﬁt is a unique 
uncertainty resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility, which 
in its very nature cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried (Knight 
1921: 310). Knight asserts that the major effect of uncertainty follows 
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with the establishment of enterprises where most of the population, 
who provide productive services to the entrepreneurs are offered the 
certainty of employment and income.
For Knight, the entrepreneurs are distinguishable from the others 
due to their willingness to bear the uncertainty with control and social 
responsibility. The entrepreneurs are ultimately in control of the venture 
and are ultimately responsible for all receipts and outlays (Kirzner 1973). 
In return they will be justly rewarded if they succeed. 
The Implications of the NEP on Entrepreneurship 
Development  
In discussing the implications, we should look at some of the elements 
of entrepreneurship and their relevance to Malay entrepreneurial de-
velopment on the back of the NEP. In her study on early Malay entre-
preneurialism, Li-Murray points out the differences in the migrating 
patterns of Malays and Chinese, saying that the former were more 
dispersal  than the waves of the collectivist Chinese bands. (Li-Murray 
1998: 150). By this, Li-Murray posits that the Malays were inclined to 
individualistic pursuits and supported themselves as independent wage 
earners since there were few Malay businesses. Li-Murray also says that 
the personalization of commercial relationships contributed to Chinese 
business success.  
While it is true that Malays lacked the kind of organizations or kongsi 
that the Chinese had, they were no less entrepreneurial, as observed by 
such eminent Malay World historians as Andaya and Andaya (1982), 
Reid (1993) and Ricklefs (1993). However, in modern Malaysia, not only 
did Malay enterprises remain small and traditional, independent trading 
scarcely survived. Malays were drawn into the kind of productive services 
Knight (1921) talks about where the certainty of employment was better 
than the uncertainty of business. The risk of uncertain income also meant 
that Malays were averse to venturing into business. Kalantaridis (2004) 
says it takes a certain amount of dare to venture into business. Malay 
entrepreneurs, especially in the rural areas, were looked upon with hostil-
ity for their apparent obsession with money and proﬁt (Li-Murray 1998: 
159). This probably explains their reluctance to go into business. Besides, 
religious virtuousness frowns upon the exploitative nature of business 
as it is sometimes perceived to be. The Schumpeter (1934) thesis of the 
entrepreneur as the 'bold leader looking to found a private kingdom' also 
does not go down well with the Malay egalitarian psyche.
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The Islamic concept of the ummah or community has reinforced the 
Malay spirit of gotong-royong or cooperative work.  Together they in-
spire the laudable giving nature of the Malay. From this we can infer 
that the individualism and competitiveness that are demanded in 
entrepreneurship are traits less likely admired and pursued. On one 
level this may be true of those more religiously inclined, particularly 
in the rural and semi-urban areas where traditions and religions are 
strong. The Malay trader in the urban centres, though, is more likely 
to be the individualist who is forced to go it alone since there is a lack 
of community networks to organize businesses as successfully as the 
Chinese, as observed by Li-Murray (1998). Similarly, there are many 
independently-run Malay businesses all over urban centres that are 
characteristically small to medium size and unspecialized. They are 
not built upon the qualities of innovation, boldness or wealth creation 
that identify the classical entrepreneur (Schumpeter 1934; Swierczek 
and Quang 2004; Montanye 2006). These businesses tend to be sole 
proprietorships or partnerships and operate around their families and 
their lack of growth can be owed to the Malay psyche of the virtues of 
self-contentment (Shome 2002).
On another level, we have the 'Melayu Baru' of well-educated techno-
crats who are in positions of inﬂuence in government-linked companies, 
in the private legal and medical professions, information-technology 
and other professional consultancies who have been inﬂuential in Malay 
entrepreneurship development. Though not entrepreneurs in the real 
sense, they are a critical link for Malay business interests who connect 
with these technocrats, for example, through the Malaysian Technology 
Development Corporation (MDTC). Formed in 1992, it is a partnership 
of the government-owned trading company, Khazanah, and a number 
of private-sector companies. The management is headed by a highly 
qualiﬁed Malay woman with a team of experienced and equally highly 
educated Malays and non-Malays. The objective of the company is to 
invest in high-technology companies worldwide. 
Malays are, without a doubt, inspired by Chinese successes in business 
but these successes were built on the strong survival instinct of early 
immigrants. For many of these immigrants their only means of liveli-
hood was doing business, usually petty, but for some their businesses 
grew substantially during the boom period of the mining and rubber 
industries. The Malays, some would argue, have no such legacy and their 
fortitude for entrepreneurial challenges is not as acute as the Chinese. 
What the Malays lack they make up amply with political power, which 
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is useful to make many things possible but would not, by itself, provide 
a guarantee of economic growth or a recipe for a creative enterprise.
Based on this premise, developing entrepreneurs through the aegis of 
the NEP would be an exercise in futility if its objective was an inclusive 
stimulus. But, of course, the NEP was not all about entrepreneurship 
development.  A signiﬁcant part of it was about Malay equity, that 30 
percent of all corporate stock would be owned by the Malays by 1990 
(Sowell 2004: 61). That was assumed on the basis that Malays would 
be sufﬁciently entrepreneurial by then. The government had believed 
that if Malays were attracted by generous ﬁnancing and preferences for 
licences, permits and public tenders, this would give rapid birth to a 
generation of entrepreneurs who would have the experience to garner 
the 30 percent corporate equity. What was not anticipated was that the 
Malays were lacking in adequate skills and know-how to develop a 
large enough base of Malay enterprises that had the liquidity to acquire 
equity in public companies. What was disturbing was that the Malays, 
who had been recipients of various concessions, such as timber mining, 
or licensed government contracting, or given access to cheap ﬁnancing, 
bartered their privileges to the Chinese in return for silent partnerships 
or company board seats.
Former Prime Minister Tun Mahathir said, 'the vast majority regarded 
the opportunities given them as something to be exploited for the quick-
est return . . . became sleeping partners . . . learn[ed] nothing . . . became 
less capable of doing business' (Straits Times, 1 August 2002).
This has been termed the 'Ali-Baba' syndrome, where the former, Ali 
the Malay, sold off to the Chinese, the Baba.5 It has been alleged for many 
years and repeated even more recently by former Deputy Prime Minister 
Tun Musa Hitam (Star, 23 March 2007). The NEP had also been exploited 
by 'fake entrepreneurs' or what some called the 'rent-seekers' (Yoshihara 
1988: 68; Searle 1999). The main activity of this group of people was not 
entrepreneurial in nature but merely to take advantage of their politi-
cal connections and access to government resources (Yoshihara 1988: 
68). To some extent, the politicized nature of Malaysian businesses has 
discouraged many Malays from getting involved in business as they 
feel that they are at a disadvantaged position to compete with the more 
politically-connected business people (Gomez and Jomo 1999: 49). There 
were allegations that the 20-odd percent that was achieved went to Ma-
lay elites whose political support was important to the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO)6 (Crouch 1992: 37-38). Of this, only ﬁve 
percent of Malays beneﬁtted from the NEP (Sowell 2004: 74).  
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One of the major setbacks of the NEP was in fact its policy of depend-
ency that equates to a 'crutch-mentality' according to former Prime Min-
ister Tun Mahathir when he addressed the UMNO General Assembly 
in June 2003. He said it was he and his government 'who provided the 
crutches. The NEP was meant as a leg-up but it consigned the Malays to 
permanent disability' (Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 2003). What 
he is saying is that the government could not create a class of Malay 
entrepreneurs if it continued to give out assistance and provide a super-
ﬁcial safe and comfortable environment for them. This goes against the 
grain of risk taking, innovativeness and autonomy, the elements that 
are crucial in the development of entrepreneurship. Another problem 
with the NEP, like any other afﬁrmative action, was that once it was 
in place, it was very difﬁcult to put an end to it. Instead, it was likely 
to grow and create a subsidy mentality with the Malays (Khoo 1992: 
65; Gomez and Jomo 1999: 25). In this respect the Malays were inclined 
to expect more regardless of whether the government was capable of 
meeting their demands (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 54). They would feel 
that it was within their right to be favoured and any attempt to question 
or put an end to this right would very likely cause a stir and anger with 
the Malays (Khoo 2003: 194-95).
 A government handout, some analysts alleged, was yet another 
example of the dependency culture as shown in February 2000 when 
the government announced a RM 300 million (US$ 87 million) stimulus 
fund to help ethnic Malays survive in business. Analysts supportive 
of the initiative described the central bank fund as a necessary lifeline 
following the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Bank Negara Malaysia Gov-
ernor Ali Abul Hassan Sulaiman said the Bumiputra Entrepreneurial 
Project Fund was aimed at helping bumiputera entrepreneurs of small- 
and medium-sized companies with ﬁnancing at reasonable costs to 
enable them to undertake new or existing projects (Straits Times, 11 
February 2000).
The Proposition
The proposition is that Malaysia's afﬁrmative action, far from uplifting 
Malay entrepreneurialism, intuitively beneﬁtted non-beneﬁciaries; they 
were driven to greater resolve, had higher resilience and optimized their 
network collaboration.  
A mail-out questionnaire was conducted among a group of Malaysian 
business people, ﬁrstly, to test the proposition offered and, secondly, 
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to elicit views of the NEP, particularly on whether it contradicts the 
principles of entrepreneurship.
This paper has, thus far, relied on existing literature to ﬁnd out if 
there is a contradiction to the theories of entrepreneurship in Malay-
sia's afﬁrmation policy that is embodied in its NEP. While the literature 
would support such a conclusion, an empirical view through the lens 
of antagonists (namely, the non-beneﬁciaries) could uncover a range of 
opinions that are difﬁcult to glean from the literature.  Besides, ques-
tioning of Malay rights is prohibited by law and it was not until the end 
of the NEP in 1990 when the government elicited Malay views on its 
failure to garner the 30 percent corporate equity.7 But public discussions 
of Malay rights remained muted until the General Elections of 2008 
when Malay opposition leaders (obviously exempt from sedition laws) 
challenged the Barisan Nasional government over the continued use of 
Malay privileges. There has never really been robust discussion on the 
merits of the NEP, which was hot-footed into law in the aftermath of 
the May 13 Riots, but much street talk ensued. The Malays were obvi-
ously not too displeased but they themselves had been unconvinced 
given the disproportionate distribution of its beneﬁts (Shamsul 1997; 
Yusof 2001). 
This research, therefore, decided that a sampling of views on Malay-
sia's afﬁrmative action could make a contribution of some depth into 
questions that, up to now, have not been properly asked.
Background
To address the proposition we need to review brieﬂy some of the ear-
lier points. The NEP was formulated in response to a political crisis, a 
disgruntled Malay electorate that felt left out in the economic process. 
The loss of several Malay seats in the 1969 General Elections to Chinese 
further fuelled Malay antagonism that was later to erupt into the bloody 
May 13 Riots. The reaction of the government was to appease the Ma-
lays and the result was the NEP. When it failed to meet Malay equity 
objectives to build a core of budding entrepreneurs, changes were put 
in place to put less emphasis on setting targets for ethnic restructuring 
and income distribution. The reality is that it continued very much on 
the path of the original NEP. This was due to the political pressure that 
was brought to bear on UMNO by its grassroots. The Prime Minister, 
Dr Mahathir, took a number of Malay entrepreneurs under his wing to 
stimulate Malay stewardship in a number of enterprises that had gov-
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ernment interests. These entrepreneurs included Halim Saad of Renong, 
Tajuddin Ramli of Malaysia Airlines, businessman-lawyer Daim Zianud-
din, and Syed Mokhtar Al-Bukhary, to name a few (Balfour 2002). All 
went well until the bubble burst with the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis and 
the mantle of cronyism was cut wide open with several bailouts that 
included Mahathir's son. 
The government's sponsorship of Malay entrepreneurs was received 
with understandable resentment by non-Malays and equally by Ma-
lays who saw this as betrayal of the objectives of afﬁrmative action, 
which was about narrowing income gaps not enriching the elite class. 
The non-Malays, more signiﬁcantly the Chinese, had always grouped 
themselves in cartels under the aegis of their kongsi that ensured a 
system of self-help (Jesudason 1989; Mackie 1992; Heng 1992; Gomez 
1999). The Chinese kongsi organization has a very long tradition in 
Malaysia that dates back from their earliest arrival in the country. It is 
clan-based and till today Chinese businesses can be identiﬁed by their 
clan afﬁliations. The system has served them well to the extent that they 
are virtually self-supported with their own welfare services, schools, 
temples and a source of ﬁnancing. Chinese attribute their success over 
other indigenous rivals to their stronger socialization process and family 
patrimony characteristics (Mackie 1998: 142). In their pioneering days 
they enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and had a free rein in involving 
themselves in any business. That all changed quite signiﬁcantly, when 
the NEP was introduced, where the system of preferences for Malays 
precluded them from many businesses. Even then, under the Ali-Baba 
relationship, Chinese were able to circumnavigate the restrictions. But 
over time, Chinese business inﬂuence eroded, ﬁrstly through dwindling 
population numbers, secondly by the absorption of their businesses into 
public conglomerates that are no longer ethnically distinguishable. As 
the government tightened its policing of Ali-Baba business, the reach of 
the Chinese into new businesses was curtailed. But far from weakening, 
Chinese entrepreneurship is still formidable and the Chinese are now 
(since the General Elections of 2008) more vocal in their resentment of 
the NEP policies.
The Chinese have accommodated the political realities of the country 
typiﬁed by their doggedness but appear most comfortable doing busi-
ness with other Chinese; in many cases, with a preference for their own 
dialect groups. They can be clannish and even chauvinistic and owe their 
successes to Confucian and other Chinese values. Their tendency to work 
within their racial community is not only to optimize kinship but also to 
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create a protective curtain for their continuing survival. This can be seen 
as a reaction against outside forces and defence against policies inimical 
to their interests. The Chinese, similarly the Indians, are not altogether 
fazed by Malaysia's afﬁrmative action which, in a way, has contributed 
to an impetus for greater resolve in their entrepreneurial endeavours.
Methodology
A qualitative approach was chosen as perceptions and personal ob-
servations were required of the respondents in the survey.  Snowball 
sampling was utilized as this was the best method where a linking of 
contacts was needed and a degree of conﬁdentiality maintained (Page 
and Meyer 2000: 44, 100-03).  
A semi-structured questionnaire was chosen as the best option for this 
survey and was individually mailed to the participants. As participants 
were not identiﬁed in the survey, complete anonymity and conﬁdential-
ity was assured. Twenty-ﬁve Malaysian Chinese business people were 
surveyed; they were chosen through a network of Chinese businesses 
in Australia and New Zealand. This sample is appropriate and good 
for the study because ﬁrstly, they are Chinese who are perceived to be 
marginalized by the policies of the NEP. The Chinese were the most 
vocal about the NEP, which was seen, albeit incorrectly, as a challenge 
to their economic dominance. The Chinese in Malaysia have a signiﬁ-
cant voice in the ruling coalition government and are ever mindful of 
the role their businesses play in the Malaysian economy and overseas. 
Their inﬂuence should, therefore, not be taken lightly. Secondly, these 
overseas Chinese business people had experienced doing business in 
Malaysia under the rules of the NEP. The fact that several of them still 
have business in Malaysia underscores the point that they are either not 
opposed to or are tolerant of the NEP. The survey was structured to 
avoid any personal bias; the thrust of the survey is about entrepreneur-
ship. It is about how afﬁrmative action had impacted their business, and 
whether afﬁrmative action is an effective way to develop Malay entre-
preneurship. It is pertinent to note that the Chinese business network 
in Australia and New Zealand is actively linked to its counterparts in 
Malaysia. To this extent the participants in the survey are more likely 
to address the issues with a level of objectivity.
The sampling population was considered adequate since the satura-
tion point on responses had been reached and any enlargement would 
be unlikely to materially affect the ﬁndings. The choice of these two 
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countries was made because they are two among the three favourite 
destinations for Malaysian immigration with a good concentration of 
Malaysian business people.8 The survey was interested in differentiat-
ing emotions between those who were generally dissatisﬁed about their 
business fortunes and those who felt that the government's afﬁrmative 
action policies had directly impacted their businesses. The question-
naire had some general questions on the participant's business, such as 
how long he or she had the business; the size of the company; how the 
company was funded; if the company was family-run; and if he or she 
had any business with the Malaysian government. The second part of 
the questionnaire is given below and has been condensed for brevity. 
a)  What part of the NEP do you think disfavours the non-Malays?
b)  Do you believe that the NEP was designed to help Malays become 
entrepreneurs?
c)  Do you believe that the beneﬁts of the NEP have been fairly distrib-
uted?
d)  Who do you think were the greatest beneﬁciaries?
e)  Do you think it is necessary to abolish the NEP? If so,why? 
f)  How helpful have government departments been to you in your 
dealings on business matters?
g)  Do you consider some of the government policies to be racially 
discriminatory?
h)  Have unfavourable government policies made you more determined 
to succeed in your business?
Findings
As is the nature of a semi-structured questionnaire, ﬂexibility and elabo-
ration of the responses were encouraged. A summary of the responses 
is appended below. 
a) What part of the NEP do you think disfavours the non-Malays?
 None of the participants had a good understanding of the NEP; 
most thought it was all about the government giving beneﬁts to 
Malays. But 80 percent did not think the NEP generally disfavoured 
the non-Malays but resented the fact that certain business licences 
were reserved for the Malays.
b)  Do you believe that the NEP was designed to help the Malays be-
come entrepreneurs?
 Twenty-two did not believe the NEP could create Malay entre-
preneurs. All said by giving ﬁnancial assistance and licences, the 
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government was spoon-feeding the Malays. Most recalled that the 
NEP was planned soon after the May 13 Riots in 1969 and thought 
the idea of the NEP was to appease the Malays. Some disagreed 
that many Malays were economically backward. They felt that the 
Indians were poorer.  
c)  Do you believe that the beneﬁts of the NEP have been fairly distrib-
uted?
 Nearly all said that the NEP beneﬁts were not fairly distributed.
d)  Who do you think were the greatest beneﬁciaries?
 All said the elite in UMNO and some Malay business cronies ben-
eﬁtted most. They added that many Chinese business people with 
connections to the Chinese political parties of the MCA and Gerakan 
had also beneﬁtted through these people. Most believed afﬁrmative 
action had worked better for political and business elites than for 
ordinary Malays. They believed afﬁrmative action was responsible 
for creating an environment of cronyism but thought much of it had 
abated since the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Still, they are disturbed 
to see too many plum projects being concentrated in the hands of 
a few elites.
e)  Do you think it is necessary to abolish the NEP? If so,why? 
 Surprisingly, only ﬁve said the NEP should be abolished. The ﬁve 
said the NEP had already outlived its usefulness and the Malays 
are much more prosperous now. The others think there is still a role 
for the NEP if it is properly managed and its beneﬁts distributed to 
all races. They said the Malays are mostly in the civil service and 
have insufﬁcient numbers in the private sector. They think the NEP 
should use its resources to train (all races) in acquiring the necessary 
skills to work in the private sector. 
f)  How helpful have government departments been to you in your 
dealings on business matters?
 Here the responses were mixed. Some, such as those in the transpor-
tation and construction business who had more to do with govern-
ment departments, allege corruption was rife and efﬁciency dismal. 
Whereas others in retail or insurance, who had little or nothing to 
do with the authorities, assumed government departments were 
generally inefﬁcient because, they say, utilities, roads and drainage 
are not well maintained. But there were some who make frequent 
trips back to Malaysia, who say conditions have vastly improved. 
Generally, for those who had a lot of contact with government de-
partments, their comments were scathing of the civil servants.
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g)  Do you consider some of the government policies to be racially 
discriminatory?
 Most did not think that government policies were racially dis-
criminatory but said they had suffered racial discrimination when 
they competed with Malays for government business. They were 
unhappy with Malay preferential rights, which they claimed had 
excluded them and other non-Malays from new business oppor-
tunities. But, despite this, they do not believe they are racially 
discriminated against by the government or the Malays. Most have 
very good Malay friends and ﬁnd Malays generally honest, caring 
and easy to work with.  
h)  Have unfavourable government policies made you more determined 
to succeed in your business?
 Most said they would consider themselves disadvantaged by certain 
government policies but being 'smarter' and 'streetwise' (some of 
the terms used by the respondents) gave them the impetus to ﬁnd 
ways and means to 'get around the rules'. Some said they have used 
their Malay friends (some are, in fact, partners in their companies) 
to 'win' government business. Sixty percent of the respondents said 
they did not depend on the government too much as ﬁnding re-
sources was easier for them as they had good working relationships 
in their network. Finding capital, too, was not very difﬁcult as they 
could depend on family, their clan connections and Chinese banks, 
which were usually quite accommodating to their needs. They did 
not allow government policies to discourage them; the majority did 
not think they impacted their businesses much as they were more 
determined to succeed against all odds. Interestingly, all said they 
see better business opportunities in Malaysia than in Australia or 
New Zealand.
Comments
The ﬁndings answered the proposition offered, that is, the NEP had, 
in a way, worked to the advantage of non-Malay business people. On 
the second premise, the respondents do not believe that government 
assistance can create entrepreneurs, and in this respect, accept that af-
ﬁrmative action contradicts entrepreneurship. 
These ﬁndings from a small sample are by no means conclusive. Re-
sponses were repeated and underlined the saturation effect of the survey 
and this goes some way to validate the conclusion. It should be noted 
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that there were no sharp differences in the responses from either cur-
rent or former business people. Some bias from disgruntled immigrants 
was expected and this was factored into the analysis. Responses were 
not quite as acerbic as was expected; some felt the afﬁrmative action 
policies were necessary for political stability. 
What of the Future?
Though the NEP ended ofﬁcially in 1990, its policies are still in practice.9 
During the hustings of the 2008 General Elections, Malay opposition 
voiced aloud its dissatisfaction over the continuing use of Malay rights 
and the lack of economic equity. Unlike in previous elections, when 
such protests were muted, the election campaign this time was vitriolic 
and extremely acrimonious.  The opposition was emboldened by stern 
calls from Anwar Ibrahim, then leader of the opposition Parti KeAdilan 
Rakyat (now leader of the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat), for the 
abolition of Malay privileges in the NEP, and the promotion of afﬁrma-
tive action policies for the poor of all races (Asia Times, 7 March 2008). 
This could be seen as appealing to non-Malay voters since Anwar's party 
and the Islamic party, PAS, are in coalition with Chinese opposition 
parties in the grand coalition of the Pakatan Rakyat.
The General Elections on 8 March 2008 saw the opposition wrench 
control of ﬁve states from the ruling alliance Barisan National but it 
does not quite have the two-thirds majority in parliament to carry out 
its promises on the NEP.  The call to remove the NEP has evoked some 
backlash from Malays as it is seen as a betrayal of their preferential 
rights guaranteed by the constitution.10 Malaysians are reminded of 
the bloodshed following the 1969 General Elections, precipitated in part 
by sizeable opposition gains in the polls (Shome 2002). But it would 
be overstating to say that abrogation of the NEP would have similar 
consequences, bearing in mind that the Malay elite during Mahathir's 
government had also questioned the need to prolong the NEP (Time 
Asia, 20 August 1990), and Mahathir himself had started dismantling 
Malay privileges in the NEP (Businessweek, 29 July 2002). Anwar and the 
Malay constituent parties in the Pakatan Rakyat coalition have publicly 
supported a phasing out of the NEP.  Whether this could be defensible 
for a constitutional change, since it could impinge on some sectors of 
Malay traditional rights, is a moot question. While the openness of such 
a call could well signal a growing Malay political maturity, it is doubtful 
if it could count on crucial grassroots endorsement. The rural Malays, 
_________________________________________________________________________61
________________ The Contradiction of Entrepreneurship through Afﬁrmative Action
whom the NEP intended as the greatest beneﬁciaries of NEP, are also 
the bastion of UMNO, the Malay party and the largest coalition partner 
in government. 
What then is the political cost to UMNO for the change? The loss of 
ﬁve states to the opposition in the 2008 General Elections was put down 
by several media commentaries to corruption and cronyism in the Ab-
dullah Badawi government. With Najib Razak's impending transition 
to the UMNO leadership and to Prime Minister in March 2009, there 
is still some disquiet in UMNO over his leadership and party unity. 
He will need every bit of support to galvanize Malay unity, ever more 
critical in 2009, which is expected to be a tumultuous year. Najib Razak 
or UMNO would therefore be least likely to play into the hands of the 
opposition on matters of Malay preferential rights. Still, the clarion 
call by the opposition for the abrogation of the NEP afﬁrmative action 
policies resonated with some middle class Malays but mainly with non-
Malays, though most would be prepared to see it watered down.11 That 
the call was made by Anwar Ibrahim, a Malay, and de facto leader of 
the opposition, was important. As a former Minister of Finance in the 
Mahathir government he was responsible for implementing many of the 
afﬁrmative action policies and, no doubt, had seen ﬁrsthand many of the 
abuses of the policies. He would have also realized that the NEP was no 
route to developing Malay entrepreneurship as well. But to win Malay 
hearts, he, too, would barter for a status quo of Malay privileges.  
Conclusion
This paper contends that there is a contradiction of entrepreneurship 
through afﬁrmative action in the case of Malaysia. In arguing for this 
position, the paper offered deﬁnitions of afﬁrmative action and entre-
preneurship and applied them in the Malaysian experience. The NEP 
was also examined to see in what ways it has assisted in entrepreneur-
ship development. The NEP has had many successes but in its role for 
entrepreneurship development it did not measure up. This is based on its 
benchmark of 30 percent Malay ownership of public companies. While 
there is some justiﬁcation in pursuing a policy of afﬁrmative action to 
redress economic imbalances, it is hard to see how it can create entre-
preneurs since its policies contradict the principles of entrepreneurship. 
The state, through the NEP, is seen as perpetuating a culture of depend-
ency on the electorate, by which it claims its continuing right to govern. 
Indeed, what party would not want to be in power forever? So, is there 
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a will by the Malaysian government to do anything less with the NEP 
if its political survival depends on it? Probably not. To not do anything 
would be to recycle the dependency ethos and that would inevitably 
lead to disaster as handouts swell with population growth. 
The NEP reafﬁrmed Malay preferential rights and this aggregated 
mostly with jobs in the civil service and in the uniformed and armed 
services, preferential treatment of Malay businesses for public projects 
and tertiary admissions. With the security offered in their employ-
ment, there is the question of whether this has inhibited the Malays 
from striking out on their own. Paradoxically, afﬁrmative action could 
be seen as the Malays' worst enemy as it has the potential to 'uncreate' 
entrepreneurship because it takes away the psychological element of 
risk-taking. And, with no burden of risks, there is little pain should the 
business fail. Rather than making the Malays more entrepreneurial, 
government assistance can be seen as indirectly contributing to the 
greater resilience of the non-recipients namely, the Chinese and Indians. 
These non-Malays, in their effort to survive, could be expected to ﬁnd 
innovative and creative ways to compete and consolidate their prudent 
use of capital and resources. There is also the moral question of equity: 
the NEP budget is funded by taxpayers, many of whom are poor; is it 
conscionable to see their hard-earned money enriching others?
There is no cultural reason why Malay entrepreneurship cannot be 
developed. It should be noted that the lack of entrepreneurial drive 
by Malays cannot be attributed to their strict adherence to religious 
precepts because Islam does not prohibit business. In fact, Islam was 
propagated throughout the Malay isles by the entrepreneurial endeav-
ours of Muslim traders in the spirit of their ummah (Ricklefs 1993). If we 
do away with afﬁrmative action, since evidence says it stiﬂes creativity, 
innovation and competition, we will still have to ﬁnd another way to 
deal with the difﬁcult questions of racial estrangement and inequality 
that spawned afﬁrmative action in the ﬁrst place. Simple answers will 
be to apply selective application and exacting preconditions. That could 
work where marginalized communities are demographically small and 
where the political cost is minimal. It is more problematic and politi-
cally unfeasible where the majority are the beneﬁciaries. Such is the case 
with Malaysia.
There is already talk about clipping the perks of the NEP (Star, 23 
March 2007). Former Deputy Prime Minister Tun Musa Hitam, who sat 
on the advisory council of the huge Iskandar Development Project in 
the southern state of Johor, said investors will not be constrained by the 
_________________________________________________________________________63
________________ The Contradiction of Entrepreneurship through Afﬁrmative Action
NEP policies of local partnerships, capital structures, Malay employment 
quotas and other pro-bumiputera policies (Straits Times, 24 March 2007). 
While this was a heartening announcement, Musa Hitam did not really 
have the powers to see through such policies. But coming from such an 
inﬂuential person, it showed a willingness to negotiate the objectives of 
the NEP. How the NEP will pan out eventually, and if the changes to it 
will apply equitably to all parts of the country, is a political mineﬁeld 
the government will have to tread very carefully indeed. Doing away 
with it cannot be an urgent or immediate option as there is still much to 
be done to redress Malay economic unhappiness and the underdevel-
opment of entrepreneurship. There are also the consequences of losing 
grassroots support of rural Malays who regard afﬁrmative action as their 
inviolable right and a symbol of national ownership. That said, Malay-
sia's non-Malay constituents are not exactly demanding the abolition of 
the NEP and will continue to tolerate it if it promises further political 
stability, growth and ethnic harmony. For the longer term, a watered 
down version of the NEP, cleared of the more obvious inequities and one 
that is inclusive of all economically marginalized communities, would 
be a more palatable and sustainable proposition.  Indeed this has been 
the call of moderate Malays and non-Malays that holds the promise of 
revitalizing Malay entrepreneurship development.
The paper also reconﬁrmed, by the proposition offered, the premise 
that afﬁrmative action policies have the effect of driving non-beneﬁciar-
ies to greater determination. It also conﬁrms the assumption that state 
assistance, because of its dependency ethos, inhibits entrepreneurial 
development as it cushions failures and uncertainty inherent in the 
challenges of entrepreneurship. We can safely conclude that afﬁrmative 
action policies contradict the principles of entrepreneurship.
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NOTES
1  The NEP ended ofﬁcially in 1990 but in name only; since then it has been sustained 
by other names such as the National Development Policy (NDP), the National Vi-
sion Policy (NVP) and the National Mission Plan (NMP). For simplicity the NEP 
acronym will be used throughout this paper. This is also still the acronym frequently 
mentioned by politicians and the media.
2  The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) in its report the 'Malaysian Indian Mi-
nority and Human Right Violations Annual Report 2008',  which was made public 
at a conference in Chennai , India, 7-9 Jan. 2009, (http://makkal.org/ﬁles/mimhr-
var2008.pdf, retrieved 23 Jan 09), claims not only are the Indians (mainly southern 
Indians) the most marginalised but also the most oppressed. Though the group is 
obviously partisan, the data offered in its report were implied to be accurate as they 
were quoted from ﬁgures reported in the New Straits Times of 29 Aug. 2008, 23 and 
28 Oct. 2008, and the Utusan Melayu of 27 June 2008.      
3  http://www.genting.com/history/index.htm retrieved 28 December 2008. Honorif-
ics such as Tan Sri or Dato' are conferred by rulers or sultans of Malaysian states as 
proof of their patronage.
4  There had never been an agreement on a formula for equity calculation. This ﬁgure 
appears in the Ninth Malaysian Plan as released by the Economic Planning Unit 
of the Prime Minister's Ofﬁce. http://www.epu.jpm.my/rm9/html/english.htm 
retrieved 27 Jan 2009.
5  This is a euphemism for a Malay-Chinese illegal partnership, that is, normally to 
mean a Malay allowing his name to be used by the Chinese.
6  The UMNO, MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) and the MIC (Malaysian Indian 
Congress) are the three largest component parties of the BN (Barisan Nasional or 
National Front). Other parties in the BN are the Gerakan, PPP, etc. 
7  It should be noted that discussions on Malay rights are sacrosanct and offenders 
could be liable under the Sedition Act.
8  Information gathered from Malaysian Chinese in Australia and New Zealand. All 
of the respondents maintain business and social ties in Malaysia, and as noted, most 
still see better business opportunities in Malaysia. 
9   The NEP has been superseded by different names, the most current one being the 
National Mission Plan.
10  The New Straits Times of 31 December 2008 reported a demonstration by a Malay 
group who protested against calls to abolish Malay preferential rights. In 2008, 
HINDRAF, a Hindu Indian activist group had widespread demonstrations against 
the excesses of the NEP and had sought redresses against Indian economic plight. 
11  This was mentioned several times by panel members of election forums on Malaysian 
TV during the 2008 General Elections. 
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